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Abstract The main goal of the present research was to
demonstrate the interaction between category and causal
induction in causal model learning. We used a two-phase
learning procedure in which learners were presented with
learning input referring to two interconnected causal rela-
tions forming a causal chain (Experiment 1) or a common-
cause model (Experiments 2a, b). One of the three events
(i.e., the intermediate event of the chain, or the common
cause) was presented as a set of uncategorized exemplars.
Although participants were not provided with any feedback
about category labels, they tended to induce categories in
the ﬁrst phase that maximized the predictability of their
causes or effects. In the second causal learning phase,
participants had the choice between transferring the newly
learned categories from the ﬁrst phase at the cost of sub-
optimal predictions, or they could induce a new set of
optimally predictive categories for the second causal rela-
tion, but at the cost of proliferating different category
schemes for the same set of events. It turned out that in all
three experiments learners tended to transfer the categories
entailed by the ﬁrst causal relation to the second causal
relation.
Introduction
Cognitive psychology has a tendency to compartmentalize
research into different areas, such as memory, learning,
decision-making, or categorization. Unfortunately, there is
little contact between these ﬁelds. Although in each of
these areas a wealth of theoretical and empirical knowledge
has been gathered in the past decades, this strategy of
divide and conquer led to notable blind spots. For example,
causal knowledge plays an important role in learning,
categorization, perception, decision-making, problem
solving, and text comprehension. In each of these ﬁelds
separate theories have been developed to investigate the
role of causal knowledge. However, it remains unclear how
these theories and empirical ﬁndings can be united. If
causal knowledge underlies decision-making, for example,
then it seems plausible to assume that our learning should
be sensitive to this important goal (see Hagmayer and
Sloman 2009; Meder and Hagmayer 2009).
Categorization and causal learning: the neglect
of their tight coupling
Our aim in the present research project was to close the gap
between two of these areas in which causality plays a
crucial role, learning and categorization. Although the
relevance of causal knowledge has been highlighted in both
of these areas, their tight coupling has not received much
attention until recently (see Lien and Cheng 2000; Kemp
et al. 2007; Marsh and Ahn 2009; Waldmann and Hag-
mayer 2006).
Research on causal and associative learning has typi-
cally neglected the role of categorization by using tasks in
which the stimuli are already pre-categorized. For example,
Waldmann (2000, 2001) presented subjects with learning
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DOI 10.1007/s10339-009-0267-xtasks in which they had to acquire knowledge about con-
tingencies between ﬁctitious substances, which either could
be present or absent, and the presence or absence of a novel
disease, Midosis. Thus, both cues and outcomes were
already categorized prior to learning so that the only
remaining task was to learn about their statistical relations
(see Shanks et al. 1996; De Houwer and Beckers 2002, for
other examples). Although this research has yielded many
interesting insights about learning, the role of categories is
neglected. But our causal learning input does not always
come with pre-categorized causes and effects. We often are
confronted with exemplars of causes (e.g., different
exemplars of biological entities) and exemplars of effects
(e.g., different symptom patterns in a set of patients) so that
we need to simultaneously learn about categories of causes,
categories of effects, and the statistical relations indicating
causal relations between these categories.
A similar shortcoming characterizes research on cate-
gorization. Although traditional similarity-based theories
have been augmented by the theory-based view, which
claims that natural concepts are often grounded in causal
knowledge (Murphy and Medin 1985; see also Murphy
2002), the tight coupling between causal and category
learning has largely been neglected. Instead, research in
this area has mainly focused on how knowledge about the
internal causal structure connecting the features of category
members affects categorization. For example, disease cat-
egories frequently refer to common-cause models of dis-
eases with the category features representing causes (e.g.,
viruses) and effects (e.g., symptoms). Many studies using
these and similar materials have shown that the type of
causal model connecting otherwise identical cause and
effect features inﬂuences learning, typicality judgments, or
induction (Rehder 2003a, b; Rehder and Hastie 2001, 2004;
Waldmann et al. 1995; Waldmann 1996, 2000, 2001). In
these studies, however, cause and effect features within the
causal models were again treated as ﬁxed, pre-categorized
entities, which already existed prior to the learning or
reasoning context. The fact that these feature categories
may need to be induced from exemplar information pro-
vided in the learning input has not been acknowledged until
fairly recently.
The interaction of category and causal learning
One of the ﬁrst studies investigating the tight coupling
between category and causal learning was by Lien and
Cheng (2000). In their experiments, Lien and Cheng pre-
sented exemplars to learners, which could be classiﬁed by
different features at different hierarchical levels of
abstraction. While in traditional supervised category
learning studies explicit category feedback is provided, in
Lien and Cheng’s experiments no category labels were
presented. Instead participants were provided only with
information regarding which exemplars generated a spe-
ciﬁc causal effect and which did not. Learners in the
experiments received pictures of substances that varied in
color and shape along with information about which of
these substances made ﬂowers bloom, and which failed to
do so. The results showed that learners categorized the
cause events (substances) at the hierarchical level that were
maximally predictive for the effect (i.e., blooming). Thus,
the induced category scheme was determined by its suit-
ability for predicting the effect. Lien and Cheng (2000)
interpreted this as evidence for their maximal-contrast
hypothesis: People tend to induce categories that maximize
their causal predictability (i.e., contingencies).
Kemp et al. (2007) have developed a computational
model implementing simultaneous learning of causal
relations and categories (‘‘causal schemata’’) in the absence
of feedback about category labels. Following the basic idea
of Lien and Cheng (2000) the model induces categories of
causes and effects that allow to optimally predict the effect
categories based on the cause categories.
Recently, Marsh and Ahn (2009) have also investigated
the question of how causal learning may inﬂuence category
formation in the absence of explicit category feedback. In a
series of experiments they presented participants with
cause events that varied on a continuous dimension (e.g.,
high, intermediate, low). In the experiments Marsh and
Ahn manipulated the assignment of the causes to a binary
effect. For example, in one condition high and intermediate
values may cause the effect, whereas in the contrast con-
dition, only high values but not the two others are causal.
The results show that learners tended to categorize the
causes according to the boundaries created by the effect.
Thus, the ambiguous intermediate value was classiﬁed
together with the high value when both caused the effect;
otherwise it was classiﬁed with the low value. These cat-
egories affected both contingency and similarity judg-
ments. These results can be predicted by Lien and Cheng’s
(2000) theory in that they show that learners try to induce
categories that maximize predictability. Interestingly, in
further studies Marsh and Ahn (2009) have shown that
these classiﬁcations remained stable even when the map-
ping between the ambiguous exemplars and the effect was
later changed.
In all of the studies mentioned above the interaction of
causal and category learning was investigated with respect
to a single causal relation. Optimality can easily be deﬁned
as maximal predictiveness as long as only one cause-effect
relation is considered (Lien and Cheng 2000). The situation
is more complex when the same events are involved in
multiple causal relations. In these situations every causal
relation may entail a different optimal categorical scheme.
Figure 1 gives two examples of such situations. The ﬁrst
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123model shows a causal chain in which the initial cause,
radiation, inﬂuences the middle event, viruses, which in
turn cause a swelling of the spleen (i.e., splenomegaly).
The second model presents three events in a common-
cause structure in which the viruses play the role of a
common cause for its two effects, bladder infection and
splenomegaly. In both causal models the virus exemplars
are part of two different causal relations.
Assuming that the viruses are presented as a set of un-
categorized exemplars, the question arises how categories
should be induced on the basis of causal information. Using
one of the two relations to induce categories yielding max-
imal contrasts will lead to optimal categories for this single
relation, but these categories may not necessarilybe optimal
for the second relation. Thus, for example, in the causal-
chain model the presence or absence of radiation may be
used to induce virus categories which yield maximal sta-
tistical contingencies for radiation. But these newly induced
virus categories may not generate maximal contingencies
withrespecttotheﬁnaleffect.Ifbothrelationsarelearnedat
once, it may be possible to induce categories that are glob-
allyoptimalforpredictingbothrelatedevents,althoughthey
may not be locally optimal with respect to either.
This question is of particular importance since causal
knowledge is rarely learned at once; we rather acquire it in
fragments which later are tied together within complex
causal models (see Lagnado et al. 2007; Waldmann et al.
2006, 2008; von Sydow et al. 2009). For example, learners
may ﬁrst learn about a single causal relation which deter-
mines how the events referring to causes or effects are
categorized. In a later learning phase, the very same
exemplars might be presented within a second relation.
Would learners now continue to use the initially induced
categories at the potential cost of suboptimal predictions
with respect to the second, later learned relation, or would
they induce a new set of categories for the second causal
relation? For example, in the common-cause model learn-
ers could induce one set of virus categories which is
optimal for predicting bladder infection, and a different set
of virus categories for optimally predicting splenomegaly.
Inducing two sets of categories would yield maximal
contrasts for either effect but at the cost of having to
activate different category sets for different effects.
Waldmann and Hagmayer (2006) presented a ﬁrst set of
studies investigating whether learners would transfer
explicitly learned categories to a subsequent causal learn-
ing task in which cause exemplars were paired with effects.
For example, they trained participants in a ﬁrst learning
phase (Phase 1) to categorize images representing different
virus exemplars. They used a standard category learning
paradigm with feedback in which category labels (‘‘allov-
edic’’ vs. ‘‘hemovedic’’) were provided. Thus, in this phase
learners acquired knowledge about two types of virus
categories. In the second learning phase (Phase 2) the same
virus exemplars were presented (without category labels)
and paired with causal effect information (presence or
absence of splenomegaly). Thus, Phase 2 closely resembled
the task in the study of Lien and Cheng (2000) (see also
Marsh and Ahn 2009). If only this learning phase was
presented, categories should be induced which, according
to Lien and Cheng, are maximally predictive for the
effects. However, alternatively learners might also opt to
continue to use the virus categories acquired in the initial
learning phase, and transfer them to the subsequent causal
learning, despite the fact that the previously learned cate-
gories were not optimal for predicting the effect in the
causal learning phase. The results showed that learners
often transferred category schemes to the second causal
learning phase, rather than inducing new ones. Especially
when the categories referred to natural kinds (e.g., viruses)
learners tended to stick with the category scheme learned in
Phase 1 rather than replacing it with a second set of cate-
gories re-classifying the same virus exemplars. One
explanation is that people seem to believe that natural
kinds refer to stable entities in the world even when the
causal relations in which they are involved are only prob-
abilistic (see also the General discussion).
Aim of the present studies
Both Lien and Cheng (2000) and Marsh and Ahn (2009)
have shown that learners induce cause categories involved
Fig. 1 Causal models in
Experiments 1 and 2
Cogn Process (2010) 11:143–158 145
123in single causal relations on the basis of feedback about
effects (i.e., effect-based categories). We will extend this
research by investigating both effect-based categories
(Experiments 2a, b) and cause-based categories (Experi-
ment 1). The primary goal of our research is to go beyond
the focus of Lien and Cheng (and Marsh and Ahn) on
single causal relations, and investigate whether categories
induced within causal learning contexts are transferred to
other causal relations which overlap with the causal rela-
tion that was the basis of the induction of the categories.
Thus, our focus will be on the interaction of category and
causal learning when participants consecutively acquire
knowledge about complex causal models. While Wald-
mann and Hagmayer (2006) have studied transfer in a task
in which category learning was based on explicit feedback
about category labels, the present studies will study the
interplay between category and causal learning in tasks that
provide only learning input about causes and effects rather
than about category labels.
In order to study how learners induce categories and
transfer them, we confronted participants in consecutive
learning phases with causal models consisting of two
causal links: causal chains (Experiment 1) and common
cause models (Experiments 2a, b). No information about
category labels was presented to participants; they only
received information about exemplars and their causes or
effects. Based on the research by Lien and Cheng (2000)
we expected learners to induce maximally predictive cat-
egories in the ﬁrst learning phase in which only a single
causal relation was presented. Our main novel goal was to
study whether learners would transfer these categories to a
second learning phase in which a partially overlapping
causal relation was presented. Importantly, the categories
entailed by the ﬁrst causal learning phase were somewhat
but not optimally predictive for the novel event presented
in the second causal relation. This setup allowed us to ﬁnd
out whether participants in fact induced categories during
the ﬁrst causal learning phase and transferred them to the
second learning phase. If they do, we should see an effect
of the categories entailed by the ﬁrst causal relation upon
causal judgments referring to the second relation. By
contrast, if participants prefer to induce novel categories
for each causal relation, we should not see an effect of the
ﬁrst causal learning phase on judgments about the second
relation.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigated learning about a causal chain
whose two links were learned consecutively (see Fig. 1).
The middle event of the chain was an uncategorized set of
virus exemplars which were causally linked to two binary
pre-categorized causal events. The experimental paradigm
consisted of two consecutive learning phases correspond-
ing to the two causal relations: In the ﬁrst phase (Phase 1)
participants had to learn about the causal relation between
the initial cause (two types of radiation) and the interme-
diate events (a set of uncategorized virus exemplars). No
reference to categories or classes was made, learners sim-
ply observed causes and effect exemplars. Then partici-
pants proceeded to the second phase in which they had to
learn about the causal relation between the intermediate
exemplars and a ﬁnal dichotomous effect (Phase 2). After
Phase 2, a test phase was administered in which partici-
pants were presented with exemplars belonging to the
intermediate event in the chain (‘‘viruses’’) and then asked
to assess their causal efﬁcacy with respect to the ﬁnal effect
(‘‘splenomegaly’’, which is a swelling of the spleen). The
conditions were designed to reveal whether participants
used the categories induced during their learning of the ﬁrst
causal relation (between the initial and the intermediate
event) when learning about and assessing the second
relation (between the intermediate and the ﬁnal event) (see
below for details).
In order to test whether the categories entailed by the
ﬁrst learning phase have a lasting or only a transient effect
on causal judgments with respect to the second relation, we
repeated Phase 2 and the subsequent test phase. If addi-
tional learning led to the induction of novel categories
optimal for predicting the effect in the Phase 2, we should
see a smaller effect of the categories induced in Phase 1
after the second iteration of Phase 2.
The initial cause of the causal chain consisted of two
types of radiation affecting the DNA of viruses, thereby
creating new viruses (the intermediate event in the chain).
The viruses were depicted schematically and had four
binary features: brightness (light vs. dark), size (large vs.
small), number of corners (ﬁve vs. seven), and number of
surface molecules (two vs. four) (see Fig. 2 for the
resulting 16 exemplars). The relation between these virus
exemplars and the disease (‘‘splenomegaly’’) was used as
the second causal link. An example of the materials and the
statistical structure of the learning data are given in Figs. 2
and 3.
The ﬁrst causal relation involved a linearly separable
family resemblance structure. Radiation of type Alpha
caused prototypically small, light viruses with few corners
and few surface molecules, while Beta radiation typically
caused large, dark viruses with many corners and many
surface molecules. Two experimental conditions and one
control condition were used (see Fig. 2 for the experi-
mental conditions). In Condition A, Alpha radiation caused
exemplars with at least three out of four features of the
small light prototype (Item 0000, cf. Fig. 4), whereas Beta
radiation caused exemplars with at least two out of four
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123features of the big dark prototype (Item 1111). In Condition
B, the boundary between these causal categories was
moved. Now Alpha radiation caused exemplars with at
least two out of four features of the small light prototype,
and Beta radiation caused exemplars with at least three out
of four features of the big dark prototype. As a conse-
quence, Exemplars 6–11, which have two features in
common with each of the two prototypes, either belonged
to the small, light prototype category (Condition A) or the
large, dark prototype category (Condition B) (cf. Fig. 2). In
the control condition participants did not receive learning
input about the ﬁrst causal relation.
In Phase 2 participants were requested to learn a second
causal relation that was identical in all three conditions (see
Fig. 3). Overall, half of the viruses caused the disease
splenomegaly, the other half did not. Viruses that shared at
least three features with the small light prototype deter-
ministically caused the disease (‘‘splenomegaly’’), viruses
that shared two features with each prototype caused the
disease with a probability of 0.5, and viruses that shared at
least three out of four features with the big dark prototype
never caused the disease (‘‘splenomegaly’’). The most
important prediction for examining transfer effects
involves the six items that were equally similar to either of
the two prototypes (Items 6–11). In the test phase learners
were requested to assess the causal efﬁcacy of these items
regarding the ﬁnal effect in the causal chain (i.e., spleno-
megaly). If learners based these estimates on the causal
categories induced in the ﬁrst learning phase, a particular
inference pattern should be obtained for the two contrasted
Fig. 2 Categories entailed by
the ﬁrst causal learning phase of
Experiments 1 and 2a.I n
Experiment 1, cause-based
categories are entailed by the
ﬁrst learning phase (i.e., virus
exemplars can be categorized
according to their causes,
namely different types of
radiation). In Experiment 2a,
effect-based categories are
entailed (i.e., viruses can be
categorized according to an
initially learned effect, bladder
infection). See text for details
Fig. 3 Categories entailed by
the causal relation in the second
learning phase (Experiments 1
and 2a)
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123conditions (A vs. B). In Condition A, participants should
reason that the intermediate exemplars belong to the class
of viruses generated by Beta radiation, which is only
weakly associated with the generation of the disease. In
this category, only two out of nine viruses created by Beta
radiation lead to splenomegaly. In Condition B, by con-
trast, these exemplars belong to the category of viruses
caused by Alpha radiation. Seven of the nine viruses in this
causal category did generate the disease. Thus, if estimates
of causal efﬁcacy are derived from the causal categories
induced in Phase 1, these exemplars should be assigned a
high probability of causing splenomegaly.
Instead of transferring the category scheme from Phase
1 to Phase 2, participants could alternatively induce new
categories that are maximally predictive for the causal
effect in the second phase (Lien and Cheng 2000). If par-
ticipants chose to optimize local predictability in this way,
they should base their judgment on the category structure
entailed by the relation to the second effect, splenomegaly.
As can be seen from Fig. 3, a tripartite category structure
underlies the second causal relation: viruses that always
cause the effect, viruses that never cause splenomegaly,
and viruses which cause the disease half of the time. In
addition, the items in the middle zone are equally similar to
both prototypes. Therefore, participants should give a 50%
rating for these exemplars if they optimize local predict-
ability and ignored the initially induced categories. This is
also what is predicted for the control condition, in which no
ﬁrst learning phase was administered.
To sum up, we expected participants in the two exper-
imental conditions to transfer the categories induced in
Phase 1 to causal learning in Phase 2, thus opting for global
coherence rather than maximization of local predictability.
Hence, participants should give low ratings for the critical
middle items in Condition A and high ratings in Condition
B. In the control condition, in which categories are based
on the second causal relation only, ratings around 50%
should be observed. These differences should hold despite
the fact that all participants are provided with identical
learning input in the second causal learning phase.
Method
Participants and design
Forty-eight students from the University of Go ¨ttingen,
Germany, participated in the experiment for course credit.
They were randomly assigned to one of the three condi-
tions. The two experimental conditions (A and B) pre-
sented two consecutive learning phases about a causal
chain, and varied the category boundary entailed by the
initial cause of a causal chain. In the control condition
participants received no ﬁrst learning phase.
Procedure and materials
The two experimental conditions consisted of two con-
secutive causal learning phases, each followed by a test
phase. In Phase 1, participants were told that scientists had
discovered that the exposure of DNA to radiation creates
new viruses and that the new viruses vary in brightness,
size, shape, and number of molecules on the surface. Fur-
thermore it was mentioned that it has been discovered that
Alpha and Beta rays generate different viruses. Then a
ﬁgure was presented depicting the viruses caused by both
kinds of radiation. This ﬁgure varied across conditions. In
Condition A, all viruses sharing at least three features with
the small, light prototypical virus with few corners and few
surface molecules (Prototype 1) were caused by Alpha
radiation. All other viruses were caused by Beta radiation.
The viruses caused by Beta radiation had at least two
features in common with the large, dark prototype having
many corners and many surface molecules (Prototype 2). In
Condition B, the mapping between radiation and appear-
ance of the viruses was altered. Here all viruses sharing at
least two features with Prototype 1 were generated by
Alpha radiation and all other viruses by Beta radiation.
Figure 2 illustrates the two conditions and the respective
category boundaries. The assignment of the radiation labels
(Alpha, Beta) and viruses were counterbalanced across the
two conditions.
After participants familiarized themselves with the
viruses and their relation to the radiation, the ﬁgures were
removed and participants were shown a pile of index cards
one after another. On the front side of each card partici-
pants were informed about the type of radiation and then on
the card’s backside about the resulting virus. Participants
received eight randomized blocks with 16 trials each,
resulting in a total of 128 cards. As a check of learning,
participants were presented with the 16 different viruses at
the end of Phase 1, and asked to diagnose the type of
radiation which created them. If participants were not able
to correctly say for each exemplar by which type of radi-
ation it was caused, they were told that their judgments
concerning the causal relations were not entirely correct,
and an additional 64 trials were administered followed by
the same test. Participants were only allowed to proceed to
the second phase if they made no mistakes this time.
Unlike in the two experimental conditions, there was no
Phase 1 learning in the control condition. In the ﬁrst phase
of the control condition, participants were only informed
that researchers had discovered new viruses and were
shown a ﬁgure depicting the 16 viruses in random order.
While the ﬁrst causal learning phase varied across
conditions, the second causal learning phase was identical
in all three conditions. Participants were instructed that
veterinarians had investigated whether the newly created
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123viruses were causing splenomegaly. It was pointed out that
every result was possible: the viruses might always cause
splenomegaly, they might only sometimes cause spleno-
megaly, or they might be completely unrelated to the dis-
ease. Data about the relation between the viruses and
splenomegaly were again shown on index cards (in random
order). On each trial participants were ﬁrst shown a virus
and then were informed whether splenomegaly had
occurred or not. An example of the data structure is shown
in Fig. 3 (cf. Fig. 4). In the particular counterbalancing
condition shown in the ﬁgure all viruses sharing at least
three of four features with Prototype 1 always caused the
disease, and all viruses sharing at least three out of four
features with Prototype 2 never caused splenomegaly.
Finally, viruses sharing two features with each prototype
caused splenomegaly with a probability of 0.5. To ensure
that all features were equally correlated with the disease it
was necessary to omit two exemplars from this learning
phase (Items 8 and 9, cf. Fig. 4). Hence, two of the items in
this category always caused the effect and two items never
caused the effect. The two remaining items were not pre-
sented to participants during learning. All six items were
used as test exemplars for the middle category. The
assignment of the disease to the viruses was counterbal-
anced by reversing the mapping between viruses causing
the disease and not causing it.
After 42 trials (3 blocks of 14 viruses) a ﬁrst test phase
was administered. Participants’ estimates of the causal
efﬁcacy of each of a set of viruses were collected. 12 of the
16 possible viruses were presented in random order: the
two prototypes, one virus sharing three features with Pro-
totype 1, one virus sharing three features with Prototype 2,
and all six critical viruses that shared two features with
each prototype. For each item participants were asked to
rate the probability that the particular virus causes
splenomegaly using a scale ranging from 0 (‘‘the virus
never causes splenomegaly’’) to 100 (‘‘the virus always
causes splenomegaly’’). Subsequent to collecting these
ratings, learners were requested to rate the causal efﬁcacy
of viruses caused by Alpha radiation and viruses caused by
Beta radiation. This question was administered to directly
tap onto participants’ knowledge about the causal relation
between the causal categories entailed by the ﬁrst learning
phase and the ﬁnal effect of the causal chain. The same
rating scale as before was used. Participants received no
feedback regarding the accuracy of their estimates.
After giving these estimates, participants were shown an
additional 42 learning trials that exhibited the same data
structure as the previous trials. Subsequently, estimates
about the causal impact of the viruses were collected a
second time using the same procedure as before. The
rationale underlying the repeated measure was to explore
what would happen when more learning data about the
second causal relation becomes available. Basically, there
are two hypotheses regarding the transfer of the category
structure from Phase 1. First, it may be the case that these
categories are only initially used but tend to be abandoned
when more learning data becomes available in Phase 2.
Fig. 4 Learning input in
Experiments 1 and 2a. The four
binary features are coded as
follows: size: 1 large, 0 small;
color: 0 light, 1 dark; shape: 0
ﬁve corners, 1 seven corners;
molecules: 0 two molecules, 1
four molecules. Regarding
Phase 2, ‘‘E’’ and ‘‘-E’’ denote
the presence and absence of the
causal effect. ‘‘T’’ denotes the
items presented in the test phase
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123Thus, in the course of Phase 2 participants may induce the
tripartite, maximally predictive category structure, or make
use of exemplar knowledge. In both cases, this would entail
that possible transfer effects would vanish. However, it
may alternatively be the case that participants recognize
over the course of learning that the initially induced cate-
gories are sufﬁciently good for making predictions. In this
case, a potential category effect may remain stable or
become even more pronounced after more trials (i.e., at the
second measurement).
Of the 12 viruses that participants rated, six were critical
for testing category transfer from Phase 1. These ‘‘critical
items’’ shared two features with each prototype. Depending
on the condition, participants were expected to rate the
likelihood that these viruses caused the effect differently. If
participants induced causal categories and used them to
derive inferences in the test phase they should give ratings
lower than 50 in Condition A and ratings higher than 50 in
Condition B. Ratings around 50 should result if participants
based their judgments only on the data from the second
learning phase (i.e., in the control condition). Estimates for
the other viruses should not differ between conditions.
Prototype 1 and the virus sharing three features with this
prototype should be assigned high causal efﬁcacy
(‘‘uncritical-high items’’). Conversely, Prototype 2 and its
nearest neighbors should be seen as not causing the disease
(‘‘uncritical-low items’’). As these exemplars always
belonged to the categories having a high and low proba-
bility of generating the effect, respectively, estimates
regarding these items should not differ across conditions.
Results and discussion
Regarding the ﬁrst causal learning phase (radia-
tion ? viruses), 14 out of 32 participants in the experi-
mental conditions made errors when ﬁrst tested, and were
therefore shown four additional blocks of learning trials.
After this additional training all participants were able to
correctly diagnose the type of radiation that created the
viruses. Therefore, all participants proceeded to the second
learning phase. For the analyses, the ratings in the count-
erbalancing conditions were recoded to ﬁt the example
described in the Introduction and the Procedure sections.
Estimates were averaged over the two uncritical-high
items, the two uncritical-low items, and the six critical
items. The mean ratings of causal efﬁcacy are shown in
Table 1, separately for the two measurements after 42 and
84 trials, respectively. A ﬁrst inspection of these data
indicates that learners’ estimates for the critical items seem
to be affected by the category structure underlying the
initial learning phase. Learners tended to give ratings
below 50 in Condition A and ratings above 50 in Condition
B, with the control condition being very close to 50.
Interestingly, the difference between the two experimental
conditions increased in the course of learning, which can
be seen when comparing participants’ estimates of causal
efﬁcacy of the critical items at the ﬁrst and second mea-
surement (Table 1). The judgment pattern obtained for the
uncritical items also qualitatively conﬁrms our predictions:
the viruses belonging to the categories having a high or low
probability of generating the effect received high and low
ratings, respectively, regardless of condition.
Separate analyses were conducted for critical and
uncritical items. First, we analyzed the uncritical items
using an analysis of variance with the variables exemplar
type (uncritical-high vs. uncritical-low) and measurement
(ﬁrst vs. second) as within-subjects variables and condition
(A, B, control) as a between-subjects variable. As expec-
ted, a strong effect of exemplar type resulted, F(1,
45) = 317.8, P\0.01, MSE = 857.8, indicating that
participants in all three conditions correctly identiﬁed the
viruses causing and not causing splenomegaly. There was
no signiﬁcant main effect of measurement, but the inter-
action between exemplar type and measurement was sig-
niﬁcant, F(1,45) = 10.7, P\0.01, MSE = 123.6. As the
means displayed in Table 1 show, estimates became more
extreme at the second measurement. Two further effects
turned out to be signiﬁcant. There was a main effect of
condition, F(2, 45) = 3.55, P\0.05, MSE = 272.0, and
an interaction between exemplar type and condition, F(2,
45) = 3.31, P\0.05, MSE = 857.8. Both effects can be
traced back to the control condition, especially to the
estimates for the exemplars not causing splenomegaly.
Participants in the control condition gave less extreme
Table 1 Mean ratings (±SE) of the likelihood of the causal effect (splenomegaly) of the second causal relation for critical and uncritical items
in Experiment 1 (N = 48)
First measurement (after 42 trials) Second measurement (after 84 trials)
Uncritical-high
items
Critical
items
Uncritical-low
items
Uncritical-high
items
Critical items Uncritical-low
items
Condition A 91.9 (3.38) 46.7 (3.15) 11.6 (3.35) 98.8 (0.97) 39.3 (4.4) 4.7 (2.16)
Control condition 81.6 (6.39) 50.6 (3.12) 24.7 (6.57) 89.4 (5.74) 48.8 (3.1) 24.4 (4.65)
Condition B 81.3 (6.05) 62.8 (5.43) 8.1 (5.18) 91.3 (3.37) 61.3 (3.1) 8.4 (4.93)
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123ratings to these viruses than in the other conditions. We
speculate that participants in this condition may have
focused on the positive set of viruses causing splenomegaly
to identify the critical features and thereby may have
neglected the negative set. By contrast, participants in the
experimental conditions could use the two categories
induced in Phase 1, thus simplifying the representation,
which may have led to more capacity to process all
exemplars. Another possible explanation of the found
tendency might be that the learners’ overall exposure time
to the virus items was reduced in the control condition
relative to the other conditions because of the missing ﬁrst
learning phase. Reduced exposure may have led to higher
uncertainty which may have manifested itself in a tendency
to gravitate toward the mean.
We next analyzed the critical items which, according to
our hypothesis, should receive different ratings across
conditions. First a repeated measurement ANOVA with
the variables measurement (1 vs. 2) as a within-subjects
variable and condition (A, B, control) as a between-sub-
jects variable was computed for the critical items. The
analysis yielded a strong effect of condition, F(2,
45) = 9.89, P\0.01, MSE = 302.5. No other effects
proved signiﬁcant. This result provides initial evidence
that participants’ learning of the ﬁrst causal relation affects
their assessment of the second causal relation. Hence, the
results suggest that participants induced categories of
viruses in the ﬁrst causal learning phase and used them to
make inferences regarding the effect relation in the second
learning phase.
To analyze these ﬁndings in more detail, we conducted a
number of pair-wise planned comparisons. First, we com-
puted contrasts of learners’ estimates of causal efﬁcacy for
the ﬁrst measurement (after 42 trials). Since we speciﬁed
the predicted direction of the effect in advance, we gen-
erally conducted one-tailed contrast tests. Consistent with
our hypothesis, a reliable difference was obtained between
the two experimental conditions (MA = 46.7 vs.
MB = 62.8, SE = 5.72), t(57) = 2.82, P\0.01. This
ﬁnding corroborates the overall conclusion and shows that
participants’ judgments differed depending on the category
structure entailed by the ﬁrst causal relation. We then
tested whether the two experimental conditions also
differed from the control condition with no Phase 1 train-
ing. The difference between Condition A and the control
condition (MA = 46.7 vs. Mcontrol = 50.6, SE = 3.95) did
not turn out to be signiﬁcant [t(57) = 0.69, P = 0.25], but
a reliable difference was obtained when contrasting Con-
dition B with the control condition (MB = 62.8 vs. Mcon-
trol = 50.6, SE = 5.72), t(57) = 2.12, P\0.05.
Next we conducted the same comparisons for the second
measurement (after 84 trials). As can be seen from an
inspection of Table 1, the difference between the three
conditions has become even larger than at the ﬁrst mea-
surement. The two experimental conditions clearly differed
(MA = 39.3 vs. MB = 61.3, SE = 5.08; t(57) = 4.32,
P\0.001), but reliable differences were also obtained
when contrasting the two experimental conditions with the
control condition. In line with our predictions, participants’
estimates in Condition A were lower than in the control
condition (MA = 39.3 vs. Mcontrol = 48.8, SE = 5.08;
t(57) = 1.86, P\0.05, while learners in Condition B gave
higher estimates than in the control condition (MB = 61.3
vs. Mcontrol = 48.8, SE = 5.08), t(57) = 2.46, P\0.01).
Finally, we analyzed the data which we collected to tap
directly onto learners’ category-level knowledge (Table 2).
Participants were asked for the probability that viruses that
had been produced by Alpha [Beta] radiation caused a
swelling of the spleen. It is important to recall that par-
ticipants were never asked to learn this relationship.
Table 2 shows the results. An ANOVA with the variables
measurement (1 vs. 2) and category (viruses that were
created by Alpha vs. Beta radiation) as within-subjects
variables, and condition (A vs. B) as a between-subjects
variable was computed. Two effects turned out to be sig-
niﬁcant. First, there was a strong effect of category, F(1,
27) = 117.4, P\0.01, MSE = 971.1, which indicates
that participants not only induced cause-based categories in
the ﬁrst learning phase, but also encoded the relation
between these categories and the effect in the second
learning phase. The second signiﬁcant effect was the
interaction between category and measurement, F(1,
27) = 4.44, P\0.05, MSE = 167.6. In accordance with
the causal efﬁcacy estimates, the difference between the
estimated likelihoods for the two categories of viruses
became slightly larger at the second measurement.
Table 2 Mean ratings (±SE) of the likelihood of splenomegaly for viruses created by Alpha radiation or Beta radiation in Experiment 1
(N = 48)
First measurement (after 42 trials) Second measurement (after 84 trials)
Category 1: viruses
created by a-radiation
Category 2: viruses
created by b-radiation
Category 1: viruses
created by a-radiation
Category 2: viruses
created by b-radiation
Condition A 78.7 (4.87) 23.3 (4.75) 86.3 (3.40) 15.6 (3.16)
Condition B 82.1 (5.66) 22.1 (5.26) 80.6 (6.68) 22.5 (5.66)
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hypothesis that participants spontaneously induced cause-
based categories in the ﬁrst causal learning phase and used
them in further learning about the second causal relation
involving the same exemplars. Interestingly, this category-
based transfer effect became even stronger in the course of
learning. Moreover, the relation between the categories
entailed by the ﬁrst relation and the terminal effect in the
chain was encoded on the category level. Hence, the
learning of the second causal relation in the experimental
conditions clearly did not fully optimize the predictability
on the local level (as in the control condition), but paid
tribute to the advantages of consistently using a single set
of categories for the whole causal chain.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that people spontaneously induced
cause-based categories of effect exemplars which, in turn,
inﬂuenced subsequent causal learning in a causal chain.
Causal chains, however, might be special with respect to
category transfer. The initial cause in Experiment 1 created
different new natural kinds. Because of the deep causal
impact of the initial cause on the intermediate exemplars,
learners may have had a strong tendency to use and transfer
the newly induced categories. But what about categories
based on effects rather than causes? An effect entailing a
categorical scheme cannot causally inﬂuence another effect
of the same exemplars. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that
people may also transfer effect-based categories. Although
effects cannot cause new natural kinds, they can be viewed
as indicators of natural kinds (see Waldmann and Hag-
mayer 2006). In this case transfer should be observed as
well. To investigate transfer with effect-based categories
we used a conceptually different causal structure in
Experiments 2a and b, a common-cause model (cf. Fig. 1).
In this model a single cause, which is presented as a set of
different exemplars, is linked to two binary effects, which
are presented in consecutive learning phases. Again our
goal was to investigate whether learners induce categories
based on the effect observed ﬁrst, and transfer them to a
causal relation involving the second effect.
Experiment 2a
Figure 1 (second panel) depicts the common-cause model
used in Experiment 2a.A si nExperiment 1, we manipu-
lated the boundaries of the category structure in the ﬁrst
causal learning phase while providing all participants with
identical learning input in the second learning phase. In
Experiment 2a we again used a family resemblance
structure for the virus exemplars, but now these viruses
played the role of a common cause. In the ﬁrst learning
phase participants learned about the causal relation
between the cause exemplars, the viruses, and the ﬁrst
effect, bladder infection. Then learners proceeded to the
second stage in which they were presented with data
regarding the relation between the virus exemplars and the
second effect, splenomegaly. Subsequent to the second
learning phase, participants were requested to assess the
causal efﬁcacy of several cause events with respect to the
second effect event. Again we were interested in exploring
whether learners would transfer the categories entailed by
the ﬁrst causal relation when subsequently learning about a
second causal relation. While in Experiment 1 the category
scheme was induced on the basis of information about a
binary cause (‘‘cause-based categories’’), in Experiment 2a
the categories were based on binary effect information
(‘‘effect-based categories’’). As in Experiment 1,n o
explicit category feedback was provided.
Method
Participants and design
Sixty students from the University of Go ¨ttingen, Germany,
participated in this experiment for course credit. They were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the two
experimental conditions (Conditions A and B) participants
ﬁrst learned about a cause-effect relation in Phase 1. The
category structures entailed by the initially presented cau-
sal relation was manipulated between conditions. In Phase
2, participants were requested to learn about a second
cause-effect relation. In this phase all participants were
provided with identical learning input. In the control con-
dition the ﬁrst learning phase was omitted.
Procedure and materials
For Experiment 2a we used the same set of stimuli
(‘‘viruses’’) as in Experiment 1. The procedure and the
instruction closely resembled those used in Experiment 1.
The main differences between the experiments arose from
the fact that in Experiment 2 participants had to learn a
common cause structure and not a causal chain. In the
experimental conditions, again two subsequent causal
learning phases were administered. The assignment of the
two effects to the two causal learning phases was coun-
terbalanced; we here use one of the counterbalancing
conditions to describe the procedure.
Prior to the ﬁrst causal learning phase, participants were
told that scientists had discovered new viruses and are now
investigating whether these viruses can cause an infection
of the bladder in animals. Like in Experiment 1 participants
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Experiment 1, the viruses were now described as causes,
not as effects. The overview contained information about
which viruses did cause a bladder infection and which did
not cause a bladder infection. After inspecting this over-
view, participants proceeded to the ﬁrst learning phase. As
in the previous study, the learning data regarding the
viruses and bladder infection were shown on index cards
one after another (in random order). First, a virus exemplar
was shown on the front side of an index card. Then,
learners had to predict whether the shown exemplar would
cause the disease. After making a prediction, they received
feedback on whether this virus exemplar had in fact caused
an infection or not. Figure 3 shows an example of the
family resemblance structure of the learning data and of
two different causal categories entailed by the causal
relation in Phase 1 of Conditions A and B. For each of
these conditions we counterbalanced which items were
linked to effects. Learning continued until participants
made correct predictions throughout a learning block,
allowing only for one error in 16 items. Then, participants
proceeded to the second learning phase. In the control
condition, no ﬁrst learning phase was administered.
While Phase 1 was manipulated between conditions,
Phase 2 was identical for all participants. We used the same
instructions and learning data as in Experiment 1 (cf.
Figs. 3, 4). Participants were told that veterinarians
investigated whether the viruses caused a swelling of the
spleen. Again it was pointed out that every result was
possible: the viruses might always cause a splenomegaly,
only some of them might cause a splenomegaly, or they
might be completely unrelated to the splenomegaly. As in
the previous study, the learning data were presented on
index cards one after another. In this phase, learners did not
make any overt predictions but only passively observed the
cause-effect pairs. As before, the assignment of the disease
to the viruses was counterbalanced.
After 42 trials (3 blocks of 14 viruses) the test phase
began. We used the same test items and rating scales as in
Experiment 1. For each test exemplar participants were
asked to judge the likelihood of the virus causing spleno-
megaly. The ﬁnal questions aimed at learners’ knowledge
on the category level. Participants were asked to rate the
likelihood of viruses causing (or not causing) a bladder
infection to cause a swelling of the spleen. We used the
same rating scales as in Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
All participants met the learning criterion in the ﬁrst causal
learning phase and therefore proceeded to the second
learning phase. The ratings concerning the second causal
relation in the counterbalancing conditions were recoded to
ﬁt the example shown in Fig. 2. Following the analyses of
Experiment 1, participants’ causal judgments for the test
items were averaged for the two uncritical-high items, the
two uncritical-low items, and the six critical items. Table 3
shows participants’ mean estimates.
We ﬁrst analyzed participants’ judgments for the
uncritical items using an analysis of variance with exem-
plar type (uncritical-high vs. uncritical-low) as within-
subjects variable and condition (A, B, control) as a
between-subjects variable. Consistent with our predictions,
a strong main effect of exemplar type was obtained, F(1,
57) = 366.36, P\0.001, MSE = 397.4, which shows that
participants clearly distinguished between viruses causing
and not causing the effect. In line with our predictions no
interaction was obtained (F\1). A weak effect of condi-
tion was found, F(1, 57) = 2.6, P = 0.08, which had not
been predicted, but can be traced back to participants’
estimates for the uncritical-low items in Condition B,
which were slightly below the two other conditions.
However, the overall pattern clearly supports the hypoth-
esis that learners’ estimates for the uncritical items should
be invariant across category conditions.
The next analyses concerned the critical items. If par-
ticipants’ estimates for these exemplars were inﬂuenced by
the categories entailed by the ﬁrst causal learning phase,
judgments should systematically differ across conditions.
The data shown in Table 3 indicate that the ratings con-
form to the predicted qualitative trend. For the very same
viruses, estimates in Condition B (M = 53.7) were higher
than in Condition A (M = 44.5), with the control condition
(M = 49.7) being in between the two estimates. In this
experiment, only one factor was manipulated, which
we analyzed using planned directed t tests. We again
Table 3 Mean ratings (±SE) of the likelihood of the second causal effect for critical and uncritical items and mean ratings (±SE) of the
likelihood of the effect for causes generating the ﬁrst effect in Experiment 2a (N = 60)
Uncritical-high
items
Critical
items
Uncritical-low
items
Category 1: viruses
causing bladder infection
Category 2: viruses not
causing bladder infection
Condition A 89.8 (3.49) 44.5 (4.51) 17.0 (4.71) 66.0 (5.73) 31.0 (6.11)
Control condition 83.5 (3.86) 49.7 (2.44) 20.3 (3.71) – –
Condition B 83.0 (3.86) 53.7 (3.88) 10.0 (3.40) 59.0 (6.11) 39.5 (5.87)
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cant difference between the experimental conditions
[t(57) = 1.74, P\0.05; SE = 5.24]. The two experi-
mental conditions did not signiﬁcantly differ from the
control condition. However, the qualitative pattern of
judgments was clearly in line with the predictions.
Finally, we analyzed learners’ category estimates of the
overall probability that viruses that caused the effects in
Phase 1 (bladder infection) led to the effect learned in
Phase 2 (splenomegaly). We used an analogous question
concerning viruses that did not cause the effects in Phase 1.
The mean estimates shown in Table 3 indicate that par-
ticipants were indeed very sensitive to the relation between
the effect-based categories entailed by the ﬁrst causal
relation and the second effect. An ANOVA with the cate-
gories entailed by the ﬁrst effect as within-subjects variable
and condition (A vs. B) as between-subjects variable
yielded a strong effect of category, F(1, 38) = 11.67,
P = 0.001, MSE = 1,273.6. No other effect was signiﬁ-
cant. This ﬁnding provides strong evidence that learners
encoded the relation between the effect-based categories of
the ﬁrst learning phase and the second causal effect.
Taken together, these ﬁndings corroborate the results of
Experiment 1 and generalize the ﬁndings to effect-based
categories and a common-cause model linking two causal
relations. Similar to the previous study, learners’ causal
judgments regarding the second causal relation differed
systematically in accordance with the categories entailed
by the ﬁrst causal learning phase. Apparently the effect
from the ﬁrst causal relation was interpreted as an indicator
of a stable natural kind category (virus) that is also relevant
for predicting further collateral symptoms. This knowledge
not only affected individual predictions but was also
accessible on the category level.
Experiment 2b
Experiment 2b was designed as a follow-up of the previous
study to replicate the ﬁndings with a different category
structure and a different procedure. While we used a pro-
totype category structure in Experiments 1 and 2a, we used
orthogonal category boundaries in this experiment (Gold-
stone 1994; Waldmann and Hagmayer 2006). The exem-
plars had four features, two relevant and two irrelevant
ones, with four levels each, which resulted in an exemplar
space of 256 items. The large number of items allowed us
to present two non-overlapping sets of cause exemplars in
the two causal learning phases. A second novel feature of
Experiment 2b is that we aligned the two causal learning
phases to ensure equal exposure to both causal relations. In
the previous studies, the ﬁrst learning phase continued until
participants had reached a learning criterion (e.g., 15 out of
16 correct predictions in a row), while the second phase
comprised a ﬁxed number of trials (which was usually
smaller than the ﬁrst phase). In the present study, both
causal learning phases are equally long. In addition, while
previously learners had to make explicit predictions in
Phase 1 (but not in Phase 2), this time the learning data was
passively observed in both phases.
Method
Participants and design
Forty-eight students from the University of Go ¨ttingen,
Germany, participated for course credit. They were ran-
domly assigned to one of two conditions, which differed
with respect to the causal category structure entailed by the
ﬁrst causal relation (category structures A vs. B).
Procedure and materials
The experimental rationale followed the previous studies.
We again administered two causal learning phases, with the
ﬁrst phase being manipulated between conditions. The
second learning phase was identical for all participants. In
the test phase the learners were requested to assess the
causal efﬁcacy of a number of cause exemplars to examine
the inﬂuence of the ﬁrst causal learning phase on the sec-
ond one.
This time we used an orthogonal category structure (see
Fig. 5). Either the size of the viruses or their brightness was
the relevant feature in the ﬁrst causal learning phase. Each
of the four features (size, brightness, number of corners,
and number of molecules) had four levels. The diameter of
the viruses varied in four steps between 30 and 48 mm, and
brightness was manipulated by using four equally spaced
levels of grayness. The number of corners varied between
ﬁve and eight, and the number of molecules between two
and ﬁve. Factorially combing all four levels of all features
yielded 256 different exemplars. Figure 5 shows examples
of the 16 types of viruses that can be created by combining
the four values of the relevant dimensions size and
brightness.
Depending on condition either size or brightness was the
relevant feature in the ﬁrst causal learning phase. As
before, the learning data were presented on index cards one
after another. Each learning phase comprised a subset of 64
exemplars with each exemplar being shown only once. We
ensured that no other feature than the relevant one was
correlated with the categories and also made sure that the
exemplars’ features were not intercorrelated. At the end of
Phase 1, we asked participants to speculate which feature
was relevant for predicting the effect bladder infection. No
feedback was given about whether the guess was correct.
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relevant dimension proceeded to the next phase. In total, 22
participants failed to reach the criterion. To ensure sufﬁ-
cient sample size, we ran additional subjects to replace
those who did not reach the criterion.
The second learning phase was identical for all partici-
pants. As in the previous studies, learners received data
regarding the relation between the viruses and splenomeg-
aly. This second learning phase also comprised 64 exem-
plars, which were different from the exemplars in the ﬁrst
phase (see Fig. 5). The learning input was again presented
on index cards which participants observed passively.
In the test phase we switched to test exemplars similar
but not identical to the ones presented in Phase 1 (i.e., they
varied on the irrelevant dimensions). Participants were
presented with eight test items one after another. For each
item they had to assess the likelihood that the shown virus
would cause splenomegaly (the effect of the second
learning phase). We used the same rating scales as in the
previous experiments.
Figure 5 depicts the statistical structure of the two
causal learning phases. Exemplars labeled with (1) denote a
sample of items from the ﬁrst causal learning phase, viruses
marked with a (2) denote exemplars used in the second
learning phase. As noted above, in the test phase we
switched back to items similar to the ones used in the ﬁrst
learning phase [i.e., items marked with a (1)], but these
items varied on the irrelevant dimensions. In the initial
causal learning phase (Phase 1), a single dimension of the
stimuli (size or brightness) was deterministically related to
the effect. For example, in the size condition small viruses
(size levels 1 and 2) did not cause an infection, whereas
large viruses (size levels 3 and 4) did cause a bladder
infection. Conversely, in the brightness condition all light
viruses (brightness levels 1 and 2) caused the bladder
infection deterministically, while dark viruses (brightness
levels 3 and 4) did never lead to an infection. None of the
other features was predictive for the causal effect. In Phase
2, which was identical for all participants, a combination of
both size and brightness was predictive for the effect (e.g.,
splenomegaly). Thus, the causal categories entailed by the
ﬁrst causal relation are probabilistically predictive for the
second effect, although not perfectly. For example, three
out of four large viruses (size levels 3 and 4) caused
splenomegaly, whereas only one out of four small viruses
(size levels 1 and 2) caused the effect. Similarly, the effect
is present in 75% of the light viruses but only in 25% of the
dark viruses. A combination of the individual feature lev-
els, by contrast, allows for maximal predictability. All
large and light viruses cause splenomegaly, whereas the
small and dark ones never generate the effect. Viruses with
other combinations of these features (i.e., small and light;
large and dark) had a 50% chance of causing the effect.
Thus, to achieve maximal predictability in Phase 2,
learners would have to induce a two-dimensional category
boundary.
Fig. 5 Example of stimuli used
in Experiment 2b. Exemplars
denoted with a (1) were shown
in the ﬁrst causal learning phase
(e.g., viruses ? bladder
infection). Depending on
condition either brightness or
size was the relevant feature.
Items denoted with (2) were
shown in the second causal
learning phase (e.g.,
viruses ? splenomegaly). E?
and E- denote the presence and
absence, respectively, of the
second causal effect presented
in Phase 2. See text for details
Cogn Process (2010) 11:143–158 155
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in the ﬁrst learning phase and transferred them to the
second stage, a speciﬁc pattern of inferences should result.
Similar to the previous studies, estimates for a number of
cause exemplars should strongly differ between conditions
(i.e., critical items) while other exemplars (uncritical items)
should yield similar predictions regardless of condition.
Consider again Fig. 5. The critical items are the small and
light viruses and the large and dark viruses, both of which
have an overall chance of 50% to cause the effect. If
learners based their causal judgments only on the data
presented in the second learning phase, both types of
viruses should receive similar ratings. By contrast, if
learners used the categories entailed by the ﬁrst phase, then
different judgments should arise. According to a bright-
ness-based categorization, the small and light viruses
should receive relatively high ratings, since overall the
light viruses have a 75% chance of causing splenomegaly.
Conversely, the large and dark viruses should receive low
ratings, since large viruses generate the disease in only one
of four cases. The exact opposite pattern is entailed when
the causal categories of the ﬁrst causal learning phase are
based on the size of the viruses. Then, the small and light
viruses should receive relatively low ratings, whereas the
large and dark exemplars should elicit high ratings.
For the uncritical items no difference is predicted.
Regardless of whether size or brightness had been predic-
tive for the ﬁrst causal effect, the cause items that are
simultaneously large and light should be considered highly
effective, since they always belong to the class that is pre-
dictive for the effect, regardless of condition. By contrast,
the small and dark cause exemplars should always yield low
ratings, since they in both conditions fall into the category
that is only weakly associated with the second causal effect.
The assignment of effects (bladder infection and
splenomegaly) to the learning phases and the assignment of
exemplars to the two causal learning phases were coun-
terbalanced. In addition, we also balanced which items
were critical or uncritical by rotating the effect structure
(Fig. 5) clockwise.
Results and discussion
Table 4 shows the results of Experiment 2b. Participants’
estimates for the critical and uncritical items are listed
separately depending on the predictions entailed by the
respective condition. For example, the column labeled
brightnesslow/sizehigh contains the mean rating for exem-
plars that, presuming that learners sticked with the initially
acquired causal categories, should receive low judgments
of causal efﬁcacy in the brightness condition but high
ratings in the size condition. A ﬁrst inspection of the data
for the critical items shows that the obtained response
pattern indeed reveals a strong inﬂuence of the experi-
mental manipulation on learners’ judgments of causal
efﬁcacy for the critical items.
We conducted separate analyses for the uncritical and
critical items. We ﬁrst analyzed learners’ estimates for the
uncritical items. An ANOVA with exemplar type (uncrit-
icalhigh vs. uncriticallow) as within-subjects variables and
condition (size vs. brightness) as between-subjects variable
yielded a strong effect of exemplar type, F(1, 46) = 63.28,
P\0.001, MSE = 867.1, and a weak, non-signiﬁcant
effect of condition F(1, 46) = 2.56, P = 0.11, MSE =
353.9. As expected, no signiﬁcant interaction was obtained.
Next, we conducted the same analysis for the critical
items. An ANOVA with exemplar type (brightnesslow/
sizehigh vs. brightnesshigh/sizelow) as within-subjects vari-
able and condition (size vs. brightness) as between-subjects
variable yielded the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 46) =
6.7, P = 0.01, MSE = 1,347.5. Consistent with the
expected disordinal interaction is the lack of a main effect
for the exemplar variable (F\1). However, unexpectedly,
the between-subjects variable condition turned out to be
signiﬁcant, F(1, 46) = 5.90, P\0.05, MSE = 406.5,
which may be due to differences in the features’ salience.
In summary, these results corroborate the ﬁndings of
the previous studies. Using a different category structure,
equally long learning phases and no learning feedback
(i.e., unsupervised learning), we obtained further evidence
for category use in a common-cause model. Initially
induced causal categories were transferred to learning of a
further causal relation involving the same category
exemplars.
General discussion
The main goal of the present set of studies was to dem-
onstrate the tight coupling between category and causal
Table 4 Mean ratings (±SE) of the likelihood of the second effect in Experiment 2b (N = 48)
Condition Uncritical items Critical items
Brightnesshigh/Sizehigh Brightnesslow/Sizelow Brightnesshigh/Sizelow Brightnesslow/Sizehigh
Brightness 67.1 (5.01) 21.9 (5.22) 67.7 (5.78) 44.8 (6.22)
Size 75.8 (4.62) 25.4 (5.29) 38.1 (6.99) 54.4 (5.24)
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123induction. Lien and Cheng (2000) demonstrated that
learners induce categories that maximize predictability
when cause exemplars are linked to a single binary effect
(see also Marsh and Ahn 2009). While this research
focused on effect-based categories, we studied both effect-
and cause-based categories. Effect-based categories were
studied in the context of common-cause models, whereas
we investigated cause-based categories in the context of a
causal chain. In both models causal information was used
to establish optimally predictive categories in the initial
causal learning phase.
The central goal of our studies was to investigate the
stability of the induced categories across causal learning
contexts. While previous research has investigated cate-
gories in the context of single links (Lien and Cheng 2000;
Marsh and Ahn 2009), our more complex models allowed
us to investigate a potential conﬂict between local pre-
dictability and global coherence. Unlike in Waldmann and
Hagmayer’s (2006) experiments, which investigated this
question with a different paradigm, no explicit category
label feedback was provided and participants were never
requested to induce categories.
We used a two-phase learning procedure in which
learners were presented with learning input referring to two
components of a causal chain (Experiment 1) or a com-
mon-cause model (Experiments 2a, b) with the overlapping
event being presented as a set of uncategorized exemplars.
Phase 1 was modeled after Lien and Cheng (2000) and
supported their conclusion that learners induce categories
based on causal input in the absence of explicit category
labels. The novel question investigated in this paper con-
cerns the subsequent learning phase, in which the exem-
plars were presented in the context of a further causal
relation. Now participants had the choice between trans-
ferring the causal categories from Phase 1 at the cost of
suboptimal predictions in Phase 2, or they could induce a
new set of optimally predictive categories within Phase 2,
but at the cost of a proliferation of different category
schemes for the same set of exemplars. In the three pre-
sented experiments learners clearly chose the ﬁrst option.
They preferred to stick to the categories induced in the
initial causal learning phase and transferred them to the
subsequent causal learning phase. In order to predict a
second causal effect of an exemplar, participants obviously
considered whether the exemplar belonged to a category of
exemplars that was either generated by a speciﬁc cause
variable (Experiment 1) or was generated by a further
previously learned effect (Experiments 2a, b). Moreover,
learners were capable of directly accessing knowledge
about the relation between the more abstract categories and
the effect in Phase 2, although they never were asked to
induce or use categories. This ﬁnding lends further support
to the hypothesis that participants used the categories
entailed by the ﬁrst learning phase while learning about the
second causal relation.
Directions for future research
An open question we did not examine in the present set of
studies concerns the way the newly induced categories are
represented. For example, are people forming an abstract
category representation, or do they represent categories in
terms of exemplars? Both Lien and Cheng (2000) and
Marsh and Ahn (2009) have provided evidence for cate-
gory formation in causal contexts. For example, Marsh and
Ahn have shown that effect information alters the sub-
jective similarity structure of the cause exemplars. Our
category-level ratings also show that people do not only
store exemplar knowledge but also learn on the category
level. However, exemplar information is certainly not lost.
Waldmann and Hagmayer’s (2006) data suggest that
learners gather knowledge about both categories and
exemplars.
The most important ﬁnding of our studies is that learners
generally preferred to stick to the initially learned catego-
ries over inducing new ones optimized for each causal
relation. A plausible explanation for this preference, in line
with the results of Waldmann and Hagmayer (2006), is that
with categories referring to natural kinds, such as viruses,
people believe in a common essentialist core, which must
not arbitrarily be altered based on new information. This
assumption is consistent with psychological essentialism
(Medin and Ortony 1989), which is claimed to underlie the
naı ¨ve representation of natural kinds from childhood on
(Gelman 2003). A related view ties psychological essen-
tialism to causal-model theory. A number of researchers
have argued that natural kinds may be represented as
common-cause models or chains with the essentialist fea-
tures playing the role of a hidden common cause or initial
event (Gelman 2003; Rehder 2003a, b; Rehder and Hastie
2004; but see Strevens 2000 for a slightly different view).
How does this causal approach explain our ﬁndings?
Possibly, people have a strong intuition that viruses, an
example of a natural kind, are deﬁned by hidden causal
features which are causally linked to the two effects in the
common-cause model or to the initial cause and ﬁnal effect
in the causal chain. Thus, they may represent the relations
between the three events as being connected by a contin-
uous, unbroken causal mechanism, which would be dis-
rupted if the events were re-categorized. This hypothesis
could be tested by manipulating learners’ beliefs about the
underlying causal mechanism. Only if a common mecha-
nism links the causal effects, transfer of categories should
be observed, whereas in situations in which different
aspects of the exemplars are involved in different relations,
learners might opt for inducing new, more predictable
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123categories in Phase 2. Initial evidence consistent with this
theory comes from Waldmann and Hagmayer (2006). They
have shown that people abandon previously learned cate-
gories about viruses, when in the second learning phase a
causal relation was presented that did not refer to the causal
power of viruses but to their superﬁcial appearance. In their
Experiment 3, Waldmann and Hagmayer required partici-
pants to learn about two types of viruses in Phase 1, but in
Phase 2 these viruses were introduced as candidates for
esthetic patterns which could be used in interior design.
The task in the second phase was to predict whether ﬁcti-
tious subjects in a study testing the attractiveness of the
patterns would like the appearance of the virus or not.
Thus, for the new causal relation the hidden causal power
of viruses to cause diseases was irrelevant. As a conse-
quence, learners neglected the categories from Phase 1 and
induced new ones in Phase 2. It would be interesting to
explore whether similar effects can also be shown with
chains or common-cause models and a procedure in which
no category label feedback was provided. Such a study
would provide boundary conditions for the effect discov-
ered in the present set of studies that learners tend to induce
categories based on causal feedback and transfer them to
new learning episodes.
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